


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USSR-Pakistan: Moscow is seeking to expand its aid programs in Pakistan.

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UK - Middle East: A high British official is skeptical of success for US-Soviet Middle East talks.

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USSR-PAKISTAN: THE USSR HAS FIRMLY ENDORSED THE NEW MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND IS SEEKING TO EXPAND ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PROGRAMS IN PAKISTAN.

ACCORDING TO AN AIDE MEMOIRE PRESENTED BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR DEGTYAR TO GENERAL YAHYA KHAN ON 6 MAY, MOSCOW HAS OFFERED TO EXTEND AN ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC CREDIT OF \$22 MILLION UNDER THE TERMS OF A 1966 AGREEMENT. THE USSR ALSO PROMISED TO KEEP UP ITS EFFORTS TO COMPLETE SEVERAL ECONOMIC PROJECTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED UPON.

THE SOVIETS WILL BEGIN NEXT YEAR TO ASSIST IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF TWO HEAVY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT PLANTS, ONE TO BE LOCATED IN EAST PAKISTAN, BUT THEY SAID THAT THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH THE KALABAGH STEEL MILL IN WEST PAKISTAN AS THEIR STUDIES INDICATE IT IS NOT ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE. DEGTYAR ALSO SAID THAT MOSCOW HOPED PAKISTAN WOULD INCREASE ITS USE OF OUTSTANDING COMMERCIAL TRADE CREDITS. HE ADDED THAT MOSCOW IS READY TO BEGIN TALKS ON TRADE FOR THE 1971-75 PERIOD.

IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AID, DEGTYAR STATED THAT WITH THE FILLING OF OUTSTANDING ORDERS FOR TEN MEDIUM TANKS AND OTHER GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT, EXPECTED IN MAY OR JUNE, DELIVERIES UNDER THE PRESENT AGREEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED. EQUIPMENT ALREADY DELIVERED, ACCORDING TO DEGTYAR, INCLUDES 50 MEDIUM TANKS AND 30 130-MM. GUNS. DURING THE VISIT IN MARCH OF MARSHAL GРЕЧКО, PAKISTAN AGREED TO SEND MILITARY DELEGATIONS TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS THE SUPPLY OF NAVAL AND ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT, BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION WHEN THESE VISITS WILL TAKE PLACE.

UK - MIDDLE EAST: A HIGH-RANKING FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL HAS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THE US AND USSR CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT IN THEIR TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

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[REDACTED] THIS OFFICIAL IS NEVERTHELESS CONVINCED THAT THE BEST HOPE OF REACHING A SETTLEMENT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS RESTS WITH THE TALKS BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR IN WASHINGTON. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW COMPROMISING THEIR DIFFERENCES, GIVEN THE DIFFERENT INTERESTS, ATTITUDES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE BILATERAL TALKS BREAK DOWN, THE FOUR-POWER EXERCISE WILL AUTOMATICALLY BECOME MEANINGLESS. BEFORE THIS CAN HAPPEN, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT LONDON WOULD PRESENT TO THE OTHER POWERS--IF FEASIBLE AS A JOINT EFFORT WITH THE FRENCH--ITS FULL POSITION ON A SETTLEMENT. IF THE FOUR POWERS WERE STILL UNABLE TO AGREE, THE BRITISH WOULD PUBLICIZE THEIR POSITION IN HOPES OF MARSHALING WORLD OPINION BEHIND THE EFFORT TO REALIZE A SETTLEMENT.

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
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